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PURSUING OPEN SPACE PRESERVATION: THE 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSERVATION RESTRICTION 
By Russell R. Sicard* 
INTRODUCTION 
The failure of traditional forms of lan~ use controls to adequately 
protect socially valuable undeveloped land from development has 
stimulated experimentation with new methods of preserving open 
space. Statutes recently enacted in many states l which attempt to 
arrest undesirable development by allowing governmental acquisi-
tion of less than fee simple interests in land have been of central 
importance. A major impetus for passage of these statutes was a 
1959 study by William A. Whyte proposing, inter alia, governmental 
acquisition of development rights only, leaving all other rights of 
ownership in the grantor, including the right of possession.2 The 
need for, and purpose of, these new open space preservation statutes 
has been well articulated by the New Jersey legislature in connec-
tion with its enactment of a law granting to certain governmental 
bodies power to acquire "interest[s] or right[s] consisting, in 
whole or in part, of a restriction on the use of land by others. . . ."3 
Recognizing that preservation of adequate open space was in the 
public interest, and noting that presently inadequate reserves of 
open space would diminish in the face of ever-mounting develop-
mental forces, the New Jersey legislature sought to use this new 
technique of open space preservation to assure the orderly develop-
ment of land and the preservation of open spaces} It was with 
similar considerations in mind that the Massachusetts legislature 
undertook in the late 1960's to enact its own program for the acquisi-
tion of rights, defined to be less than a full fee interest in land,5 that 
are "appropriate to retaining land or water areas predominantly in 
their natural, scenic, or open condition."8 The Massachusetts stat-
ute7 reaches beyond Professor Whyte's technique and many compa-
rable state enactments by describing the less than fee interest in-
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volved as a "conservation restriction", rather than as a "conserva-
tion easement." The import of this unique classification will be 
discussed, and the Massachusetts Conservation Restriction Law 
analyzed, in this article. 
Income and real estate tax incentives, which encourage private 
use of the Massachusetts law, will be explored. Lastly, the conserva-
tion restriction concept will be briefly compared with other open 
space preservation techniques. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE MASSACHUSE'ITS MARKETABLE TITLE ACT 
In Massachusetts, restrictions on the use of land, other than con-
servation and preservation restrictions as defined in the Massachu-
setts Conservation Restriction Law, are subject to the stringent re-
quirements set forth in the Massachusetts Marketable Title Act. 8 
The benefits of this exceptionD for conservation restrictions are 
noted below. Essentially, the Massachusetts Marketable Title Act 
is designed to defeat perpetual or· long standing restrictions that 
impair the alienability and use of land. As one court has noted, the 
Act "enable[s] one or more landowners to remove or prevent the 
enforcement of obsolete. . . restrictions. "10 
A. Technical Requirements 
The Massachusetts Marketable Title Act is a "statute of limita-
tions" type with fifty years as the determinative period'" As such, 
the Act provides that certain land use restrictions or other claims 
will be extinguished unless the persons holding them have recorded 
their interests within the statutory period. If any individual holds 
clear record title in a fee for the designated period, all unrecorded 
restrictions on the fee will be extinguished automatically. 12 
The effective date of the Act is January 1, 1962. In order for 
restrictions imposed on or after this date to be enforceable, certain 
conditions must be met. 13 Even if these threshold conditions are 
met, no restriction will be enforceable after thirty years unless it is 
part of a "common scheme"14 or unless re-recorded before the expi-
ration of the initial thirty years. 15 Upon such re-recording, the re-
striction is extended for another twenty years. The recorded notice 
of the restriction must comply with designated formalities. 16 
Substantially similar treatment is given to restrictions imposed 
before the Act's effective date, except that such restrictions may be 
re-recorded within the expiration of fifty years from their imposition 
or before January 1, 1964, whichever is laterY Thus, the Act " ... 
essentially provides for.saving periods during which existing rights 
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can be preserved."18 Twenty year re-recording intervals are also re-
quired. Section 29 sets out prerequisites which must be met for such 
recorded notice, and consequent extension of the restriction, to be 
effective. 
B. Additional Prerequisites to Enforcement 
Even where the above mentioned technical and formal recording 
and re-recording requirements have been satisified, other obstacles 
to enforcement of a restriction remain. These obstacles are articu-
lated in § 30 of chapter 184. Section 30 provides that a restriction 
will not be enforced, whether or not re-recorded pursuant to the 
scheme detailed above, unless it is found to be of "actual and sub-
stantial benefit" to the one claiming the right to enforce it. Even 
where such benefit can be found, a restriction will not be enforcea-
ble 19 where changes in the neighborhood have "materially reduced" 
the need for the restriction, or have rendered it "obsolete." Simi-
larly, the restriction will be unenforceable where conduct of those 
in a position to enforce it has rendered such enforcement inequitable 
(as by laches); or where continued enforcement of the restriction 
would impede the "reasonable use of the land," impair the neigh-
borhood's growth, or be inconsistent with the public interest. 
Although there is some saving language in this portion of the Act 
(i.e., a restriction could be found to be "consistent with the public 
interest," as helping to attain "the reasonable use of land"), the 
Act's thrust is very definitely adverse to the enforcement and long 
term validity of restrictive agreements voluntarily entered into, and 
is conducive to land transfer and development. The continuance of 
a restriction is endangered by court findings of "original purpose,"20 
"obsolescence," "material reduction," "intent,"21 etc. Such find-
ings, occurring many years after creation of the restriction, when the 
original parties are no longer available and other conditions have 
changed, may be open to subjectivity and inconsistency. 
Moreover, the burden will be placed on the party seeking enforce-
ment to prove that the restriction does not violate § 30. The party 
may be asked to show, for example, that a height restriction was 
imposed as part of a common scheme and was for the benefit of the 
entire tract. 22 The possibilities of a finding of unenforceability are, 
therefore, greatly enlarged, and a court will be constrained to note 
carefully if it does decide in favor of enforceability, that its decision 
does no dishonor to § 30.23 
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II. THE MASSACHUSETTS CON~ERVATION RESTRICTION LAW 
Conservation easements and covenants can be valuable tools of 
open space preservation. However, their "potential cannot be 
reached in some jurisdictions either because the applicable 
[statutory and] common law is not clear or because it imposes 
significant limitations on the flexibility of the devices."24 Such was 
the case in Massachusetts prior to enactment of the new law. 
Clearly, conservation restrictions could not serve the purposes for 
which they were created if they were subjected to the hostile judicial 
treatment generally afforded to restrictions on the use of land under 
the Massachusetts Marketable Title Act. Consequently, conserva-
tion restrictions have been excluded from the effects of the Marketa-
ble Title Act by § 26 of that Act. Moreover, through careful drafting, 
relevant common law limitations have been circumvented by the 
Massachusetts Conservation Restriction Law (embodied in §§ 31-
33 of Chapter 184) in order to ensure "protect[ion of] Conservation 
and Preservation Restrictions held or approved by appropriate pub-
lic authorities."25 
A. Method of Acquisition 
The basic method of acquisition of conservation restrictions is 
through consensual agreement between the acquiring party and the 
landowner; i. e., through private sale or donation. Restrictive agree-
ments involving acquisition of the restriction by a private party will 
not qualify. Rather, the acquiring party must be either a govern-
mental body, that is, "the United States or the commonwealth, 
acting through any of its departments, divisions, commissions, 
boards or agencies, or any political subdivision or public instrumen-
tality thereof or any public authority";28 or a "charitable corpora-
tion or trust whose purposes include conservation of land or water 
areas or of a particular such area. "27 
To qualify for the lenient treatment afforded by the statutory 
scheme, the conservation restriction must be approved by the Com-
missioner of Natural Resources if held by a governmental body; or 
be approved by certain representatives of the city or town in which 
the land is situated and by the Commissioner of Natural Resources 
if held by a charitable corporation or trust. 28 
The Massachusetts Act, like its New Jersey counterpart,29 author-
izes acquisition of conservation restrictions through the use of emi-
nent domain30 as well as by consensual agreement. This authoriza-
tion is deemed by some commentators to be essential to the effec-
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tiveness of any open space program, since consensual arrangements 
may not be forthcoming in many situations. They contend that: 
The effects of open -space programs on the social and economic life of 
urban and suburban communities are far too serious to allow them to 
be exposed to haphazard implementation through consensual arrange-
ments with willing property owners.31 
Nevertheless, the power to acquire conservation easements through 
eminent domain has not been conferred by open space statutes in 
other states.32 
B. Definition and Content 
Conservation restrictions are rights appropriate to keeping "land 
or water areas predominantly in their natural, scenic or open condi-
tion or in agricultural, farming or forest use."33 They also include 
rights appropriate to forbid or limit certain activities on the land: 
(a) [C]onstruction or placing of buildings, roads, signs, billboards or 
other advertising, utilities or other structures on or above the ground, 
(b) dumping or placing of soil or other substance or material as landfill, 
or dumping or placing of trash, waste or unsightly or offensive materials, 
(c) removal or destruction of trees, shrubs or other vegetation, (d) exca-
vation, dredging, or removal of loam, peat, gravel, soil, rock or other 
mineral substance in such manner as to affect the surface, (e) surface 
use except for agricultural, farming, forest or outdoor recreational pur-
poses or purposes permitting the land or water area to remain predomi-
nantly in its natural condition, (f) activities detrimental to drainage, 
flood control, water conservation, erosion control or soil conservation 
34 
Those activities not expressly referred to in the Act are covered 
by the catch-all subsection citing "other acts or uses detrimental to 
such retention ofland or water areas."35 The Legislature has on the 
one hand clearly defined what rights are to qualify under these 
sections as conservation restrictions. At the same time, it has pro-
vided flexibility. Such flexibility in determining the type of restric-
tion that will qualify as a conservation restriction is necessary if 
consensual agreement between the landowner and the acquiring 
body is to be the backbone of the conservation restriction program. 
Yet, a reasonably precise definition of rights qualifying as conser-
vation restrictions is necessary for an effective program. A vague 
definition of rights given under a restriction agreement may impede 
enforceability.36 Furthermore, restrictions not within the ambit of 
the legislative purposes should not be able to take advantage of 
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these provisions by mere pro forma recital of good purposes. The 
public and charitable bodies authorized to hold conservation re-
strictions are entrusted with responsibility for ensuring that such 
abuse does not occur. 
Since the law states that a conservation restriction is a right that 
will keep land predominantly in its open condition, certain struc-
tures on the land and other uses made of it by the owner are not 
precluded when a restriction is imposed. Conservation restrictions 
have been approved by the appropriate government bodies even 
though they allow for construction of houses,37 boathouses,38 docks,39 
and the posting of signs indicating ownership.40 Many restrictions 
state that all rights not expressly given are reserved to the grantor, 
thus allowing a range of consistent uses. 41 One restriction document 
even allows the grantee discretion as to what other uses, in addition 
to those noted in the agreement, "detrimental to retention of land 
in its natural condition,"42 are to be prohibited. 
The Legislature intended that the substance of a restriction 
rather than the terminology used in describing it be controlling in 
determining whether it qualifies for treatment under the law. Any 
restriction appropriate to retaining a natural, scenic or open area 
that forbids or limits certain activities "whether or not stated in the 
form of a restriction, easement, [or] covenant"43 may qualify. 
Thus, "negative" restrictions or easements may be upheld under the 
law in spite of common law impediments to their enforceability.44 
C. Recordation Requirements 
Section 33 requires that public restriction tract indexes ("a map 
or set of maps") be created and filed with the register of deeds to 
provide for the indexing of conservation and preservation restric-
tions along with other restrictions held by any governmental body. 
Certain maps "used by [tax] assessors to identify parcels taxed" 
will suffice for this purpose. Indexing of restrictions on these maps 
must include a description of the land restricted, the name of the 
person or body holding the restriction, and the place in the public 
records where the instrument imposing the restriction can be found. 
The purpose of this system is the same as that for all systems of 
recording interests in land: to provide notice in a public record that 
the land is so encumbered, so that anyone dealing with the land in 
the future will be sufficiently aware of which interests remain with 
the fee and which interests have been separated from it. Under 
§ 33 such notice must be given by an official of the governmental 
body holding the restriction, by the Commissioner of Natural Re-
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sources, or by an official of the charitable corporation holding the 
restriction. 
Most importantly, conservation restrictions indexed on a public 
restriction tract index pursuant to § 33 do not have to be refiled to 
remain enforceable. Thus, conservation restrictions may be made 
perpetual, the initial indexing satisfying the notice requirement for 
as long as the restriction might last. Other restrictions not so in-
dexed will not satisfy the notice requirement, and will not be en-
forceable unless recorded in the usual statutory manner (i. e., they 
must be re-recorded within thirty years of the initial recording and 
within each twenty years thereafter). 
This notice requirement for conservation restrictions not properly 
indexed is less demanding tha~ that found in the Massachusetts 
Marketable Title Act. Under § 27 of that Act, in addition to the 
requirements of refiling, other technical requirements must be met 
before a restriction becomes enforceable. 45 
D. Enforceability 
Since conservation restrictions are a relatively recent addition to 
the law of real property, the way in which they will be treated by 
the courts has not yet been definitively determined. There is argu-
ment to the effect that they will be classed as negative easements 
because they require a landowner to refrain from doing certain 
things with his property.48 Other authority indicates that the types 
of interests in land necessary to accomplish open space preservation 
(conservation restrictions) will be treated by the courts as restrictive 
covenants. 47 Whatever treatment the court elects, enforcement of 
the restriction would become bound up in the technical require-
ments necessary for enforcement of such interests under traditional 
property law concepts. 
Many courts will not enforce a negative easement unless it is 
"appurtenant to" a benefitted piece of land.48 At this point, the 
distinction between easements in gross and easements appurtenant 
becomes relevant. Unless the easement over a parcel of land (ser-
vient estate) is for the benefit of a different parcel of land (dominant 
estate) the easement is said to be "in gross." An easement in gross 
is considered an interest in the land personal to the original holder 
and the courts are reluctant to enforce it after transfer of the land. 
A common example of an easement in gross is a "naked right to pass 
and repass over the land of another [right of way]."49 Such a right50 
"is not, in any proper sense, an interest or estate in the land itself 
[emphasis added]. [It] is in its nature personal; it attaches itself 
to the person of him to whom it is granted and must die with the 
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person. "51 As such, it is not assignable or inheritable. 52 However, if 
the holder of the easement also holds a benefitting parcel of land 
(if the right of way is necessary for him to get to his land), then the 
easement is assignable and inheritable because it is considered an 
interest in the adjacent dominant estate rather than in the person. 
Therefore, under the common law of real property, an easement 
cannot be transferred or assigned unless it benefits a particular 
piece of land. 
Even if a jurisdiction were to recognize negative easements in 
gross, doubt has been expressed as to their assignability.53 The in-
terpretive commentary of the Wisconsin statute54 authorizing the 
acquisition of restrictions for public benefit notes the propensity of 
some American courts to follow an old English case denying enforce-
ment to a covenant to one who owns no benefitted land. To "avoid 
this technical pitfall" the Wisconsin legislators included a provision 
in their statute providing that such a requirement would not be 
necessary in order for the public body holding the right, to enforce 
it. The Massachusetts legislature has similarly precluded the crea-
tion of such difficulties in § 32 of the Conservation Restriction Law. 
Section 32 of the statute is of primary importance to the success 
of a conservation restriction. Under this Section any conservation 
restriction held by any governmental body or by a qualifying chari-
table corporation or trust will not have to conform to the bulk of the 
complex, technical common law requirements which have plagued 
courts and landowners for years in their attempts to interpret and 
enforce restrictions on the use of land. More specifically, any right 
which (1) conforms to the definition of a conservation restriction 
under § 31 and (2) is held by one of the entities mentioned above, 
will not be "unenforceable on account of lack of privity of estate or 
contract, or lack of benefit to particular land or on account of the 
benefit being assignable or being assigned to any other governmen-
tal body or to any charitable corporation or trust with like pur-
poses."55 
The effect of this legislation, then, is a clarification of "an intoler-
ably opaque area of the law ... enabl[ing] government and the 
private sector to participate in preservation and conservation pro-
grams confident that some hoary doctrine will not frustrate their 
reasonable expectations. "56 
Section 32 further provides that the restrictions may be enforced 
by an injunction or proceeding in equity. It gives the holder the 
affirmative right to police the restriction to insure compliance. Oc-
casionally, an easement allowing the grantee to enter onto the prem-
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ises and inspect for violations is granted along with the conservation 
restrictionsY 
E. Release 
Restrictions may be released "in whole or in part . . . for such 
consideration, if any, as the holder may determine," but only follow-
ing a public hearing held after reasonable public notice. The re-
quirement that a public hearing be held before any action is taken 
will safeguard against the use of variance practices that have proved 
so dangerous and arbitrary in the administration of the zoning 
power.58 
To avoid unnecessary resort to the cumbersome public hearing 
procedure, a well drawn restriction should attempt to define at least 
some of the modifications in the use of the land permissable under 
the restrictive agreement. It may also be desirable to set out in the 
initial agreement or in the statute itself a method for calculating the 
"consideration" necessary for release of the restriction.59 
Section 32 provides guidelines for use by the governmental body 
"acquiring, releasing or approving" the restriction "[i]n determin-
ing whether the restriction or its continuance is in the public inter-
est," implying that the body may from time to time review the 
status of restrictions acquired and release those they feel are no 
longer in the public interest. 6o Since local government occupies a 
pivotal position in the administration of the program, the legislature 
has determined that those bodies must have a wide range of author-
ity in dealing with restrictions if the program is to be effective. This 
delegation of power is granted upon the assumption that the local 
government will best be able to evaluate the needs of their com-
munity at anyone time. 
m. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A GIFT OF A 
CONSERVATION RESTRICTION 
Under federal law a charitable contribution is defined as a gift 
made for public purposes to or for the use of numerous entities, 
including any political subdivision of the United States, or for the 
United States, or any corporation, trust or foundation organized ex-
clusively for charitable purposes.8t "Governmental body" as referred 
to in the Massachusetts Conservation Restriction Law62 certainly 
fits into this category, as do the "charitable corporations or trusts"63 
also referred to in the law. A deduction from gross income is allowed 
for any charitable contributions made within the taxable year64 as 
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long as such deduction is not precluded by the percentage limita-
tions set forth in the Internal Revenue Code.65 
Gifts of cash can be deducted up to 50 percent of the taxpayer's 
contribution base66 for the taxable year.67 Gifts of capital gain prop-
erty are treated differently. For charitable contribution purposes, 
"capital gain property" means any capital asset (valued at its fair 
market value) which when sold at the time of the contribution, 
would have resulted in long-term capital gain.68 Since the gift of a 
conservation restriction is deemed to be a gift of capital gain prop-
erty,69 deductions for it are limited to 30 percent of the taxpayer's 
contribution base for the taxable year. 70 If a certain contribution of 
capital gain property exceeds the 30 percent limitation, the excess 
is treated as a carryover for the five succeeding taxable years,71 
allowing the deduction to be taken over a six year period. If the 
taxpayer elects to reduce his contribution by specified amounts, the 
percentage limitation is increased to 50 percent of his contribution 
base.72 Payment of capital gains tax will be avoided where a charita-
ble contribution is made and thus the donor will save this money. 
A similar savings will be realized under Massachusetts income tax 
law.73 
Certain provisions in the Federal Internal Revenue Code (the 
Code) disallow deductions for charitable and other gifts in various 
cases.74 Specifically, the Code states that "[w]here a donor trans-
fers an interest in property (other than a remainder interest in a 
personal residence or farm or an undivided portion of [his] entire 
interest in the property)"75 no deduction will be allowed. Therefore, 
for a charitable contribution of a conservation restriction to be de-
ductible it must fall within the scope of the "undivided portion of 
the donor's entire estate in the property" exception. 
Where a grantor conveys a percentage of all rights held by him in 
the property-such conveyance extending over a period covering the 
entire term of his interest in that property-he has given an undi-
vided portion of his entire interest. An example of this type of par-
tial interest would be a contribution of 50 acres to a charitable 
organization by a taxpayer who owns 100 acres of land. Also, where 
a donor contributes property to a charitable organization making 
that organization a tenant in common with him, a deduction is 
allowed.76 
Federal Income Tax Regulations (the Regulations) eliminate 
much trouble in this area by affirmatively stating that: 
. . . a charitable contribution of an open space easement in gross in 
perpetuity shall be considered a contribution of an undivided portion of 
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the donor's entire interest in property to which section 170(f)(3)(A) 
[disallowing certain deductions] does not apply. For this purpose an 
easement in gross is a mere personal interest in, or right to use, the land 
of another; it is not supported by a dominant estate but is attached to, 
and vested in, the person to whom it is granted.77 
The Regulations go on to give examples of what restrictions on the 
use of property will qualify for treatment under this subparagraph. 
These include "restrictions on height and type of building, removal 
of trees, erection of utility lines, dumping of trash, and use of 
signs."78 
Although this regulation alleviates the potentially troublesome 
"undivided portion" terminology, it has been noted that certain 
other potential difficulties remain.79 One such potential difficulty 
arises from the use of the phrase "open space" in the Regulation. It 
has been held that a gratuitous conveyance of a restrictive easement 
in perpetuity, the purpose of which was to preserve certain scenic 
views (scenic easement) is a charitable contribution for which a 
deduction will be allowed under section 170.80 The grantor is eligible 
to deduct the fair market value of the restrictive easement given, 
such value being that which one willing, but not compelled, to buy 
would pay to one willing, but not compelled, to sell-all relevant 
facts being reasonably known by both.8! An adjustment must be 
made in the basis82 of the property by "eliminating that part of the 
total basis of the property allocable to the restrictive easement 
granted. "83 
This ruling, the term "open space," and the examples of qualify-
ing restrictions given in the Regulations appear to cover many kinds 
of conservation restrictions. Yet, an uncertainty has been expressed 
as to whether various other types of restrictions, including rights of 
way for hiking or horseback riding, flowage easements for dams or 
flood plains, historic preservation restrictions, and restrictions that 
will allow construction of certain structures consistent with the 
objectives of the restrictions (e.g., boat houses, lookout towers)84 are 
to be included. 
It may be persuasively argued that the purpose of the restrictions 
mentioned above, including those that permit construction of build-
ings or other facilities, is to facilitate the enjoyment of the "open 
spaces" by the public, especially where the public has access to the 
land and a "right to use" it, whether for a scenic view, or for hiking. 
Many restrictions currently in force in Massachusetts do allow for 
public access to the land. Most, however, allow for only limited or 
no public access at all. For example, a restriction in the town of 
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Dartmouth provides for exclusive access by members of the Audu-
bon Society, and only during two thirty-day periods each year.85 
Restrictions in Yarmouth and Lexington allow for access to town 
residents only. 86 
The majority of conservation restrictions presently in existence do 
nothing more than arrest development on a certain parcel of land. 
They do not allow for any public access to the land at all. 87 Indeed, 
it is doubtful whether private parties would voluntarily place con-
servation restrictions on their land in significant numbers if public 
access was mandated. Under the Massachusetts law, a grantor is 
allowed to part with development rights, thereby relieving develop-
mental pressures, while retaining his exclusive right to possess the 
land.88 The legislature has determined that the public as a whole 
will benefit in the long run from the preservation of open spaces 
even without public access to the restricted lands. This public bene-
fit should be determinative in affirmatively answering the question 
of whether such conservation restrictions accepted by a governmen-
tal body acting pursuant to its statutory power will qualify as a 
deductible item within the ambit of the charitable contributions 
provisions of the Code. But a broad interpretation of the statute will 
be necessary. 89 
Further concern has been expressed over the use of the term 
"easement" in describing the open space restrictions that may qual-
ify for deductibility. Such concern necessarily arises from tradi-
tional connotations of the term and the technical rules applied to 
its use;90 and also from the fact that conservation restrictions are 
basically use restrictions (i. e., they restrict the uses to which the 
land can be put). As such, conservation restrictions are most compa-
rable to "negative easements." However, as has been noted pre-
viously,91 the Tax Regulation92 does specifically state that certain 
restrictions will qualify for deductibility, notwithstanding the fact 
that they also restrict the use of the land. 
The Regulations also state that merely because an interest may 
be defeated by the performance of a particular act or the happening 
of a particular event, the gift should not be disallowed where on "the 
date of the gift it appears that the possibility that such act or event 
will occur is so remote as to be negligible."93 This provision will 
encompass certain types of reversion grants,94 and presumably 
would include restrictions that contain taking clauses.95 
The language in Regulation 1.170 A-7(b)(1)(ii) that the interest 
granted be "in perpetuity" raises other problems, most notably 
those relating to marketable title acts. However, the Massachusetts 
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statute states that conservation restrictions, if given in perpetuity, 
will remain in effect in perpetuity provided they are indexed on a 
public restriction tract index.96 
A charitable contribution of a conservation restriction, like all 
charitable contributions, must be given with the requisite donative 
intent. It has been held not to be a charitable contribution where a 
taxpayer had dedicated a strip of land for use as a public road in 
order to get a concession from a zoning board.97 Also, since a "gift" 
is a voluntary transfer of property by the owner to another without 
consideration, where the grant "proceeds primarily from the incen-
tive of anticipated benefit to the [grantor] beyond the satisfaction 
which flows from the performance of the generous act, it is not a 
gift."98 Thus, a conservation restriction given solely for the purpose 
of gaining a reduction in taxes may be found not to have been given 
with the required charitable intent. Such intent, however, will be a 
question of fact. A gift of a conservation restriction given "primar-
ily" with a charitable intent (a gift given with a mixed motivation) 
would seem to qualify. 99 
IV. FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE OF A 
CONSERVATION RESTRICTION 
The classification and treatment for income tax purposes of the 
proceeds realized from the sale of an easement may differ according 
to the nature and effect of the easement itself. As this area is cov-
ered exhaustively in other articles 100 it will be only briefly noted 
here. 
When a conservation easement is sold, the threshold question 
becomes whether the income from such sale will be treated as ordi-
nary income or as capital gain. This is important because of the 
different ways these two classes of income are treated under the 
income tax laws. If a loss occurs from the sale it may be preferable 
to treat such loss as an ordinary, rather than capital, loss because 
deductions for capital loss usually are limited to the amount of 
capital gain realized in the same taxable year. Also, since ordinary 
income is usually taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, a greater 
tax benefit would be realized if the deduction is made from ordinary 
income. Where a gain is realized, it is better to treat it as a capital 
gain because of the alternative tax placed on the excess of long term 
capital gains over short term capital losses. 101 
Sales of capital assets are accorded capital gains treatment. 102 In 
determining whether the sale of an easement should be accorded 
such treatment two conditions must be present: the transaction 
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must be (1) a "sale", (2) of "property."103 Where perpetual ease-
ments are involvedl04 the transaction is held to be a sale. lOS If the 
easement sold is not perpetual, it is treated as a lease rather than 
as a sale, and the income realized therefrom is treated as ordinary 
income rather than capital gain. l06 
There has been some dispute as to whether the distinction be-
tween affirmative easements and negative easements will be deter-
minative in deciding whether an easement is "property" in the capi-
tal gains sense. 107 The case for affirmative easements being "prop-
erty" seems to be clear. With regard to negative easements (the type 
of interest in land with which conservation restrictions are most 
comparable), the problems are more complex. However, restrictive 
covenants have been given capital gains treatment. lOS Since conser-
vation restrictions are a form of restrictive convenants, the argu-
ment that conservation restrictions are "property" and hence capi-
tal assets, is persuasive. loD 
In computing whether a gain or a loss has been realized from the 
sale of a conservation easement, it is important to note that if the 
easement is such that it deprives the owner of the restricted land of 
nearly all of his beneficial interest therein, so that he in effect 
merely retains bare legal title to the land, the sale of the easement 
will be considered a sale of the fee. Such was the case in Scales v. 
Commissioner,lIo where the vendor sold an easement over a certain 
portion of his property allowing it to be used as flood plain land. As 
a result of the easement the land remained flooded ten months of 
the year and was useless for cultivation or grazing purposes. The 
amount received by the landowner for the restriction was less than 
the actual cost basis of his property.111 Consequently, the amount 
realized from the sale was not included in his income for the year. 
Instead he was allowed to deduct from income the difference be-
tween the cost basis and the amount received, as a capital loss. 
Such computation is more difficult where the sale ofthe easement 
allows the vendor to retain at least some beneficial use of his prop-
erty and hence does not qualify as a "sale" of the fee. Since the 
purpose of a conservation easement is primarily to allow the land-
owneF to retain certain benefits and enjoyment from his land while 
concurrently preserving open spaces, such easements undoubtedly 
fall into this category. The problem is one of allocating the basis of 
the property as a whole between the rights conveyed and the rights 
withheld by the fee owner.1I2 What must be determined is the basis 
of the easement rights conveyed so that this value may be deducted 
from the actual proceeds of the easement sale in order to determine 
what gain or loss has occurred. 
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A discussion of one of the methods proposedl13 to compute this 
basis value, the "ratio method," will be helpful in understanding 
the problem. For example, suppose that a tract of land had been 
bought for $4000. Several years later the land's fair market value has 
risen to $10,000 and an easement is sold burdening the land (for 
whatever purpose) for $2000. The ratio of the current value of the 
. 2000 
easement to the current value of the full fee IS: l() 000 = 1/5. 
, 
Applying this ratio to the basis of the full fee, we arrive at a basis 
value for the easement rights conveyed: 1/5 x $4,000 = $800. Thus 
there will be capital gain of $2000 - $800 = $1200. The mechanics 
of this approach are simple; but the practicality of it is questiona-
ble, especially where the value of the rights given by the easement 
has increased or decreased disproportionately with the value of the 
full fee (i. e., where the value of easement rights has increased at a 
slower rate than the value of the full fee). This method and others 
are useful subject to certain noted qualifications.ll4 Where determi-
nation of the basis of the easement rights conveyed will be highly 
speculative, courts may still allow the grantor to treat the proceeds 
as capital gain by allowing the amount received from the sale of the 
easement to be subtracted from the basis of the full fee. This ad-
justed basis will be utilized in determining capital gain or loss when 
the land (the remaining rights to the fee) is later sold. In such a case, 
where a sale of an easement produces income in excess of the basis 
of the property, the excess will immediately be treated as capital 
gain and the adjusted basis of the land will become zero. liS For an 
analysis of this topic in greater depth the reader should consult the 
authorities cited.1I6 
V. REAL ESTATE TAX REASSESSMENT 
Another motivating force for the sale or gift of a conservation 
restriction is the expectation that the grantor, having given up cer-
tain rights in his property, will be entitled to a downward re-
valuation of the restricted property and a subsequent decrease in 
real estate taxes. 
Open space programs have attempted "to prevent the forced con-
version of such open space to more intensive uses as a result of 
economic pressures"l17 such as rising real estate taxes and appealing 
offers from developers to sell for subdivision. An efficient way to 
ease such pressures is to relieve the beleaguered property owner of 
the burden of rising real estate taxes. How can this be effectuated? 
Under Massachusetts law, assessors are obligated to make a fair 
cash valuation of all property, real and personal, subject to taxa-
-----~----
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tion. 1I8 This standard of "fair cash value" has been held to mean 
"fair market value" - the price that a willing buyer would pay to a 
willing seller. 119 It means the highest price a normal purchaser under 
no compulsion is willing to pay at the time, and not exceeding the 
amount that the seller could obtain after a reasonable effort.12o In 
determining this value, assessors must look to the value of the prop-
erty for all uses to which it could reasonably be put,12I the best and 
"highest use"122 ordinarily being the basis for tax allocation. 
Thus, it must be ascertained how a conservation restriction, when 
given or sold to a municipality or charitable corporation, or when 
condemned, will affect the fair cash value of the property which it 
encumbers. In the case of Lodge v. Inhabitants of Swampscott, 123 
the court found that a use restriction (prohibiting construction of 
buildings) in a deed devising certain lands acted to diminish the fair 
cash value of the lands, and held that the land should be assessed 
for taxation at that diminished value. The court observed that 
"[t]o assess this property without regard to the restriction would 
... be to assess it for an amount in excess of its fair cash value and 
in violation of the statute."124 Therefore, as long as the use and 
enjoyment of the land are affected by the restriction and the restric-
tion can be found to diminish the land's fair cash value, a downward 
reassessment will be forthcoming. That most conservation restric-
tions prohibiting development of land will be covered by this ruling 
is clear. 
Evidence that other types of restrictions, including rights of way 
for hiking or watercourses and use of land for flood plain purposes, 
will also fall within the scope of this principle can be found in court 
recognition of decreased land value in condemnation of easement 
cases from various jurisdictions. The courts have applied the "be-
fore and after" test in such cases in determining the amount of 
damages to be paid to landowners whose property has been bur-
dened by an easement. Where easements for flowage l25 or a right of 
way for gas and oil pipe lines l26 were taken, the landowners were 
entitled to recover the difference between the fair market value of 
the land before and after the taking. In certain instances, but very 
rarely, property that is encumbered through condemnation to such 
an extent that exclusive control is in the public, or the potential use 
of which is effectively extinguished, may be exempt from taxation 
altogether even though the owner retains legal title to the fee. 127 
In theory, therefore, downward reassessment should be a substan-
tial boon to a conservation restriction program. However, practi-
cally speaking, application of this policy may be problematic in 
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light of certain administrative difficulties, and the political reality 
that local government finances are heavily dependent on local prop-
erty taxes. 
A. Administrative Problems of Downward Reassessment 
Massachusetts law specifically provides for separate assessment 
of any parcel of land upon which a conservation restriction has been 
imposed. Assessors are to reassess any such restricted land on or 
about January 1st of the year following imposition of the restric-
tion. '28 Thus, the reassessment is mandatory, and armed with this 
authority the tax assessor can allow the taxpayer an immediate 
realization of the benefit of his agreement to burden his land. An 
owner of restricted land need not wait for a general reassessment of 
the area as would ordinarily be the case. 
Property tax assessors, however, are given no guidelines to follow 
in determining the amount of diminution in fair cash value realized 
when a restriction is placed on the land. Accordingly, haphazard 
and inconsistent valuations are likely, absent the discovery of work-
able standards to fill this void. Fortunately, the area is not without 
precedent. In 1973, the New York Court of Claims held that the 
taking of a scenic easement restricting the use of the land to farming 
caused the fee to diminish in value by 90 percent.129 In making this 
determination the court analogized the scenic easement involved to 
powerline easements previously given such treatment. 130 
Thus far, treatment of conservation restrictions by tax assessors 
in Massachusetts has varied widely, ranging from 13 percent to 95 
percent diminution. '31 Significant variation may be justified be-
cause of substantial differences in circumstances surrounding the 
restricted land in question. Where development is prohibited on 
land near expanding or already existing residential communities it 
is difficult to see how the land can have greater than nominal value 
in a "fair market". Such was found to be the case in one community 
on the outskirts of Boston, but the appraiser was reluctant to allow 
a reduction of more than 75 percent of value. '32 In light of the New 
York Court of Claims decision discussed above and the realities of 
the open market, a reduction in the range of 75-90 percent is cer-
tainly justified by the "fair cash value" theory. 
In the typical case, assessors will resort to comparable sales of 
similar lands in similar areas as their yardstick for assessing land. 
This effort will be unavailing, however, where conservation restric-
tions are concerned, because such restrictions are usually trans-
ferred in perpetuity to towns, charitable organizations or trusts who 
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generally have no desire to part with them even if sale on the open 
market were possible. Thus, valuation guidelines are necessary but 
unavailable. 
Common sense standards, however, are discoverable. Downward 
reassessment should vary proportionately with developmental pres-
sure on land in the area. Presumably, this pressure will decrease as 
the distance from the urban area increases. Existing zoning require-
ments, although frequently subject to variance, should also be con-
sidered by the assessor when reassessing restricted land. Certainly, 
a promise not to build on a one-half acre plot where zoning require-
ments prohibit building on anything less than a full acre, will be of 
less consequence than a similar restriction in an area where building 
is permitted on such a plot. 133 
One of the most thorough reassessment policies established to 
date in Massachusetts is used by the town of Barnstable on Cape 
Cod. 134 There a percentage formula is used as a guideline for reas-
sessment. The town will accept no restriction of less than 15 years 
duration, and will exclude the first one acre of land upon which 
buildings or residences stand from reassessment. The remaining 
land is reassessed at a percentage of its current valuation. 
For example, land over which restrictions are placed in perpetuity 
is to be revalued at 15 percent of current valuation. Land restricted 
for 15 years is to be revalued at 60 percent of current valuation. It 
is also possible in certain areas for a conservation restriction to 
merely cause a freezing of current valuation, as where a community 
has a policy of assessing these lands at "use values" rather than at 
"highest and best use value."135 
B. Policy Problems of Downward Reassessment 
One commentator has pointed out that "the property tax remains 
the most important source of revenue for local government."136 
Thus, a primary concern of every municipality in accepting a re-
striction and downwardly reassessing property will be the preserva-
tion of the town treasury. Will the "cost" of a conservation restric-
tion program in terms of lost revenue be justified by the benefits 
of open space preservation? 
An incident in Maryland indicates the seriousness of this concern. 
That state has instituted a program allowing for assessment of farm-
land at use value. Over a six year period the owners of one 904-acre 
track of land saved over $348,000 in real estate taxes. 137 However, 
to those who would attack the conservation restriction program as 
one that will inevitably exhaust city funds, Professor Whyte re-
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sponds that in a well thought out, well administered open space 
program, only a relatively small portion of the total land area under 
consideration need be restricted. Accordingly, the goal of the pro-
gram should be "to secure the rights for the key areas which, though 
only a fraction of the total, tend to set the character of the whole. "138 
He goes on to state even more emphatically that: 
One has reason to hope that study will demonstrate that an intelli-
gently planned open space program will not hurt the community's tax 
base. It is true that the landowners who have given up their rights 
should not be taxed at the going market value for surrounding land 
available for development, but let it be noted that, if they don't pay the 
higher rate, it is because they will not saddle the community with the 
demand for new services [e.g., schools, roads, sewers] .... Nor is land 
'frozen' at its current value simply because it cannot be developed; as 
noted earlier, it seems highly likely that much of the land in such areas 
will greatly increase in value because of the supply and demand situa-
tion for the remaining 'estate' land. 13B 
Professor Whyte supports his argument by pointing to the extra 
costs necessary to provide municipal services for the "kind of hit or 
miss" development that takes place in many areas today. He real-
izes that the program will raise many financial questions, but also 
believes that these are not insurmountable. 140 
Another consideration antagonistic to the assertion that the costs 
of a conservation restriction program to local government outweigh 
the benefits has been referred to as the "betterment theory." This 
theory has been articulated in a variety of instances where lands, 
or restrictions on land, have been sought for public purposes. 
Townsend v. State1U is an interesting case in this area. That action 
involved a landowner's suit for compensation after certain parcels 
of land were taken for highway construction. Using the "before and 
after" approach, the court allowed a deduction from the land-
owner's damages equal to the amount by which he had benefitted 
from the improvement. 142 Likewise, special assessments may be al-
locable to landowners who benefit from a nearby improvement since 
the resulting benefit is reflected in property values (i.e., the land-
owners are merely paying for what they receive}.143 Arguably, if not 
actually, proximity of residential and other areas to areas burdened 
with conservation restrictions will bestow a benefit which may be 
reflected in property values and resultant taxes. 144 
Moreover, the betterment theory has been an important factor in 
land assessment for many years. A study made on the impact of 
park areas on adjacent lands notes that assessed values of such 
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lands rose by an amount fourteen times the average percentage 
increase of other land in the city over the same period of time. 145 
Although such an overwhelming result is unlikely today, the study 
is a vivid illustration of the theory's validity. 
Since open space can be a private as well as a public benefit, 
assessors may be justified in raising the assessed value of lands 
adjacent to properties encumbered by conservation restrictions on 
a betterment theory rationale. This principle should not, however, 
be arbitrarily applied in all cases. Individual circumstances such as 
the nature of restriction imposed, the area generally, and whether 
a benefit can be shown accruing to particular landowners in addi-
tion to the general public must also be considered. 
Another potential solution to the local revenue problem may be 
provided by devices known as rollback taxes and conveyance fees. 
Section 32 of the Massachusetts law provides that a restriction may 
be released for such consideration as the holder may determine. 
Some provision, either in the agreement creating the restriction or 
specifically in the statute, is necessary in order to insure that open 
space uses will actually be maintained in exchange for preferential 
tax treatment, especially where a restriction is not given in perpetu-
ity. Although downward reassessment certainly makes holding of 
the land easier, it also makes selling more appetizing because the 
profit margin at sale is increased. 148 Many statutes allowing for pres-
ent use value assessment on certain classes of land provide for roll-
back taxes or conveyance fees as types of penalty provisions where 
the use restriction is discontinued or violated. 147 
The Massachusetts Agricultural and Horticultural Land Act, 148 
which provides for use value assessment of farm lands, is fairly 
typical. The Act provides that whenever land valued and assessed 
pursuant to its provisions is sold for some other use within a pre-
scribed period,149 it will be subject to a conveyance tax. The amount 
of the conveyance tax will be a varying percentage of the sale price: 
ten percent if sold within the first year of ownership, nine percent 
if sold within the second and so on.150 The Act further provides that 
where the qualifying use of the land under the Act is changed, 
rollback taxes will be computed for the tax year in which the use is 
changed and for the preceding four years. 151 The rollback taxes or 
conveyance fee will be paid, whichever is greater. The rollback tax 
for a one year period is equal to the difference in the use value tax 
and the tax that would be assessed were the assessment based upon 
potential use. 152 
It remains to be seen whether such taxes will be a sufficient deter-
rent to prevent abuse of the law by speculators.153 Even so, such a 
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deferred tax program allows the owner to pay this tax out of his 
capital gain upon sale (with or without interest) making the holding 
of property easierl54 in the face of rising tax prices and other pres-
sures, while at the same time combatting speculation and potential 
abuse of the preferential tax treatment. A similar provision should 
be inserted in the Massachusetts Conservation Restriction Law or 
in the agreement recognizing the restriction. 
The conveyance fee is the suggested procedure in Barnstable. 
There, a "conveyance penalty percentage" based upon a percentage 
formula has been adopted to determine the amount to be charged 
the grantor in case a restriction is released. The applicable percent-
age is applied to the "current full and fair market value of the 
subject land, unencumbered by any restriction." The percentage 
used depends upon the original duration of the restriction and the 
number of years that have passed since the effective date of the 
restriction. For example, a 40 percent conveyance penalty fee is 
applied to a restriction given for 30 years for which release is sought 
prior to the expiration of 15 years from its effective date. For release 
after 15 years have elapsed, a 35 percent penalty fee is imposed.155 
Conversely, to safeguard the conservation restriction grantor 
where land to which the restriction applies is condemned for public 
use, the restriction should terminate and immediately revert to the 
grantor so as to insure full compensation of the landowner. The 
restriction agreement itself can cover this possibility. 158 In lieu of 
rollback taxes and conveyance fees, and especially where restric-
tions are given for shorter terms, a graduated tax should be placed 
on the land, recognizing the fact that as the time for termination of 
the restriction approaches the land becomes more valuable. 
VI. A COMPARISON WITH OTHER LAND USE CONTROL DEVICES 
A. Zoning and the Conservation Restriction 
Use of the conservation restriction as a supplemental tool in pro-
moting orderly land development can yield many benefits not other-
wise realizable. Implementation of a zoning plan, for instance, en-
tails no direct public expenditure and little in administrative 
costS.157 However, its utility is limited and has generally proved 
inadequate as a method of preserving open spaces. 15S Where a zoning 
ordinance purports to preserve open spaces by greatly restricting the 
uses to which the land can be put, courts will declare it voidl59 as 
being in reality a taking of the land for a public purpose without just 
compensation-a Constitutional violation. leo On the other hand, if 
the landowner cannot prove a taking he may go uncompensated for 
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the interference with his right to use his land. lSI As Professor Whyte 
points out, it is more equitable to treat open space preservation as 
a benefit to the public for which the public, not private parties, 
must pay.182 Moreover, gross abuse of the zoning variance procedure 
often defeats the essential purpose of the zoning plan. 
Minimum lot zoning has gained popularity as a method of pre-
serving open spaces,183 but it too is defective in that "it tends to 
accentuate rather than diminish scatteration"l84 (haphazard, leap-
frog development). Conservation restrictions and minimum lot zon-
ing plans are, however, similar in effect in that both methods cause 
portions of land to become undevelopable, thereby arresting devel-
opment altogether or forcing it into other areas. In addition to the 
possibility of accentuating "scatteration," such developmental re-
strictions can cause serious adverse social effects: 
[I]n-city migration of the rural poor with an out-city migration of high-
and moderate-income people together with business and industry has 
resulted in social polarization, inequity in job, educational and recrea-
tional opportunities and ... urban crisis. Lack of job and housing 
opportunities in the suburbs for the unskilled poor and minorities rein-
force the polarization. Land use controls, specifically exclusionary zon-
ing, have helped to direct the division of society into ghettos and moder-
ately well-off suburbs.185 
In Fairfax County v. Carper,188 the court held that where the 
practical effect of an amendment to an existing zoning ordinance 
increasing minimum lot size was to exclude people in low income 
brackets from the area, it would be struck down as serving private 
rather than public interests. "Such an intentional and exclusionary 
purpose would bear no relation to the health, safety, morals, pros-
perity and general welfare."187 The decision in the Fairfax County 
case has led one writer to conclude that minimum lot zoning cannot 
be relied upon in the future. 188 Whether, owing to improper use, the 
purpose and utility of conservation restrictions will one day be sub-
jected to similar skepticism and disdain, one can only speculate. 
Also, since financially sound suburban communities, already bene-
fitting from abundant open space, are most likely to make substan-
tial use of the law, the legislature must be alert and willing to 
intervene should the beneficial effects of an open space preservation 
program be offset by the choking effect on the urban poor who do 
not have the resources available to meet the necessarily increasing 
costsl89 of escaping to the suburbs. 
The use of conservation restrictions as a tool in the bargaining 
process of developers and local government when developers seek 
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permission to build in a particular area will have effects similar to 
those found in "incentive zoning" procedures. Such procedures are 
not alien to Massachusetts law. In Sylvania Electric Products, Inc., 
v. City of Newton 170 an agreement between the town and the land-
owner, whereby the landowner agreed to impose certain. restric-
tions on his property and to deed a certain portion of his property 
to the town in return for a zoning amendment in his favor, was 
upheld by the court as a valid exercise of zoning power. Similarly, 
when a developer applies to a town for a special permit to construct 
housing or otherwise develop the land, the town has the power to 
issue a conditional permit requiring, for example, that the petitioner 
"grant to the [t]own ... a conservation restriction in which [he] 
undertakes to excavate a sump in Swamp Brook upstream of Sud-
bury Road, to excavate the ditches and that portion of Swamp 
Brook abutting the site and to clean and keep free of silt the culvert 
beneath Sudbury Road."171 The court which upheld this conditional 
permit noted that the standards to be applied in determining 
whether comprehensive permits should be issued are primarily 
those of reasonableness and consistency with local needs. From a 
developer's point of view, granting a conservation restriction to a 
town as part of his development scheme may be helpful in persuad-
ing the town that the permit is consistent with "local needs." In 
addition, a restriction on land which creates buffer zones in and 
around a development will make the development more attractive 
and allow for higher prices on property therein. 
B. Eminent Domain and TDR's: The Old and the New 
Eminent domain is effective as a land use control device because 
it allows the government to take property for public purposes upon 
payment of just compensation. However, since costs can be prohibi-
tive,172 any long range planning effort must rely on something other 
than the taking power alone to achieve its goal. The conservation 
restriction complements this power well. (1) Since less than a full 
fee simple is acquired when conservation restrictions are sold or 
taken by eminent domain, costs are reduced and the financial via-
bility of eminent domain as a tool of open space preservation is 
augmented. (2) Owing to various pecuniary and non-pecuniary in-
centives, conservation restrictions will most often be created by 
consensual agreement, thus avoiding any ill feelings that may arise 
when a landowner is deprived of his land. Although creation of 
conservation restrictions by consensual agreement does not allow for 
the same degree of control over the location of restricted land as does 
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eminent domain, the utility of this technique cannot be denied, 
especially since many grantors are willing to bestow conservation 
restrictions on local government gratuitously. 
Another comparatively new and relatively untested land use con-
trol device meriting attention here is the "transfer of development 
rights" method (TDR).173 At optimum efficiency, this device, like 
zoning, requires little expenditure of public funds for implementa-
tion other than administrative costs, and is thus less costly than the 
conservation restriction method. The primary goal of a TDR pro-
gram is to "create a market for development rights in which owners 
of developable land must buy development rights from owners of 
preserved open space land as a prerequisite for development."174 The 
municipality is in effect the middleman. It merely allocates devel-
opment rights equitably among parcels of land. Owners of developa-
ble land must acquire development rights from owners of undevel-
opable land in requisite quantity before the proposed development 
can take place. If the market in TDR's functions smoothly, the 
municipality will bear little of the costs of the program. 
According to Professor Rose,175 the first step for each local govern-
ment in establishing a TDR program is to prepare a land use plan 
designating which lands are to be preserved as open space, which 
are to be developable, and the extent of allowable development. 
Next, that number of development rights necessary to allow a dis-
trict to be developed to the full extent deemed desirable under the 
plan are distributed to that district. 
Owners of land designated as open space will receive these rights 
(in the form of certificates) on a percentage basis. When developers 
desire to build upon developable land, they must purchase from 
owners of open space land that number of development rights neces-
sary to implement the proposed development. Thus, open land will 
be preserved and the owners of the land will be compensated with-
out any costs (except possible administrative costs) to the govern-
ment. 
Forms of this technique have been used in New York176 and Chi-
cago.177 A short illustration of the New York plan will be helpful in 
understanding the mechanics of the technique.178 The New York 
City system is concerned with the preservation of historical land-
marks. The pressures on those owning landmarks to demolish them 
and build modern high rises are the same as those put on owners of 
open space land to sell to the developer for subdivision. The ration-
ale behind the plan is that landmarks usually have authorized but 
unused floor area. 179 If a developer wishes to build in an area where 
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more intensive land use is allowed, he must purchase any additional 
floor area he desires from the owner of the historical landmark. As 
a result, the landmark owner is compensated for not developing and 
the cost to the government is minimal. Note that in this plan tax 
losses on landmark property are offset by increased taxes on lots 
receiving transfer of development rights. 
CONCLUSION 
A craftsman must use all of the tools at his disposal in order to 
create his masterpiece. So must it be with those who seek to create 
and effectuate a long range, well balanced community development 
plan. The "conservation restriction" as created by Massachusetts 
law is an invaluable addition to the growing arsenal of land use 
control devices. The legislature has done its homework and drafted 
wisely, eliminating enforcement problems before they arise. Also, 
due to the substantial real estate and income tax incentives for 
private sale and donation of conservation restrictions to public and 
charitable bodies, the legislature has created an appealing incentive 
for voluntary, individual landowner involvement in an open space 
preservation program. As these advantages become known, use of 
this device should increase. But the conservation restriction concept 
must be viewed with the caveat that it may prove to be primarily a 
tool of the well-to-do community. A close scrutiny and continuing 
reevaluation of the program by the legislature is necessary to insure 
that the benefits of open space are not realized at the expense of a 
significant decrease in the mobility of lower and moderate income 
families. The resulting "polarization" and inequities may be too 
great a price to pay for the preservation of open spaces. ISO 
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The court found in the former case that the intent of a restriction 
having an anti competitive effect was not to benefit a particular 
landowner, but rather to assure orderly development of the area. 
The restriction was upheld. A similar restriction in the latter case 
was not upheld because the court found that it was intended to 
benefit a particular landowner and therefore did not "run with the 
land" as required. 
22 Harrod v. Rigelhaupt, 298 N.E.2d 872 (1973). This case illus-
trates the potential difficulty of meeting such a burden. 
23 [d. at 877-79. 
24 Brenneman, Techniques for Controlling the Surroundings of 
Historic Sites, 36 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 416, 421-22 (1971). 
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25 Act of August 11, 1969, ch. 666, [1969] Mass. Acts & Resolves 
537. 
28 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 26 (Supp. 1974). 
27 Id. § 32. 
28 Id. 
29 N. J. STAT. ANN. 13:8A-30 (Supp. 1973). 
30 "[O]r in any order of taking .... " MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
184, § 31 (Supp. 1974). 
31 Krasnowiecki and Paul, The Preservation of Open Space in 
Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 192 (1961) [hereinafter 
cited as Krasnowiecki and Paul]. 
32 Id. 
33 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (Supp. 1974). 
34 Id. 
35 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31(g) (Supp. 1974). 
38 Krasnowiecki and Paul, supra n. 31, at 192-94; Whyte, supra 
n.2, at 44-45. 
37 Reference will be made to existing restrictions on file at the 
Department of Natural Resources, 100 Cambridge St., Boston, 
Mass. 02202, according to their file number. The file number indi-
cates the town in which the restriction is found, with the restrictions 
numbered chronologically. The restrictions referred to here are 
Dartmouth #3, Plainfield #1. 
38 Chilmark #1. 
39 Duxbury #3. 
40 Dennis #1. The signs are only of dimension 2'x3: 
41 Eastham #1. 
42 Sherborn #3. For an opinion that this may be going too far, see 
Whyte, supra n. 2, at 44. 
43 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31 (Supp. 1974). 
44 See text at n. 48 infra. 
45 See supra, n. 13, for discussion of § 27. 
48 Whyte, supra n. 2, at 44. Examples cited by Prof. Whyte in-
clude many "prohibitions" and "restrictions" against certain acts. 
These are similar to those found in the Massachusetts law. See text 
at n. 34, supra. 
47 Krasnowiecki and Paul, supra n. 36, at 194. 
48 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.2 as cited in Costonis, The 
Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban 
Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 613 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
Costonis]. 
49 Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. 614 (1873). 
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50 Massachusetts conservation restrictions are legislatively de-
clared to be interests in land. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 
(Supp. 1974). 
51 Boatman v. Lasley, 23 Ohio St. 614 (1873). 
52 [d. 
53 Costonis, supra n. 48, at 614 and 614, n. 149. 
54 WIS. STATS. ANN. tit. 21, ch. 326, § 293 (1957). 
55 Some restrictions provide that if the grantee is unable or un-
willing to continue to hold the restriction, it must use its best efforts 
to transfer it to another qualified holder. See Dennis #1, Chilmark 
#2, Weston #1. "Privity of estate" is another complex and elusive 
common law property requirement. 
58 Costonis, supra n. 48, at 617. 
57 Sudbury #1. 
58 "[V]ariances can make a sieve out of a community 
plan .... " Whyte, supra n. 2, at 45. 
59 See section on real estate taxes, text at nn. 145-56 infra. 
80 "[T]he governmental body acquiring, releasing or approving 
shall take into consideration the public interest in such conservation 
or preservation, and any national, state, regional and local program 
in furtherance thereof, and also any public state, regional or local 
comprehensive land use or development plan affecting the land, and 
any known proposal by a governmental body for use of the land." 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 32 (Supp. 1974). 
81 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c)(1), (2)(B). 
82 See text at n. 26, supra. 
83 Examples of "charitable corporations or trusts" holding restric-
tions in Massachusetts include the Duxbury Rural and Historical 
Society, the Essex Greenbelt Association, the Weston Forest and 
Trail Association, and the Westport Land Conservation Trust. 
84 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(a)(1). Much guidance in develop-
ing this section was gained through use of the Massachusetts Con-
servation Commission Handbook published by the Massachusetts 
Association of Conservation Commissions, 506 Statler Office Build-
ing, Park Square, Boston, Mass. 02116. 
85 [d. § 170(b). A person making a gift of a conservation restriction 
must file a gift tax return when the value of the gift or gifts to one 
donee is greater than $3000. J. Hillsberg, THE FEDERAL INCOME, Es-
TATE, AND GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE SALE OR GIFT OF A CONSER-
VATION EASEMENT, at 32 (1970) (published by Institute for Environ-
mental Affairs, University of Pennsylvania) [hereinafter cited as 
Hillsberg] . 
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66 "'[C]ontribution base' means adjusted gross income. 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b)(1)(F). 
67 Id. § 170(b)(1)(A). 
68 Id. § 170(b)(1)(D)(iv). 
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69 See section on Income Tax Consequences of the Sale of a Con-
servation Restriction, text at nn. 100-09 infra. 
70 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(b)(1)(D)(i). 
71 Id. § 170(b)(1)(D)(ii). 
72 Id. § 170(b)(1)(D)(iii). 
73 Massachusetts Conservation Commission Handbook. 
74 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(f). 
75 Id. §§ 170(f)(3)(B)(ii), 2522(c)(2). 
76 TREAS. REG. § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(i) (1974). For another example of 
a gift of this type of interest see REv. RUL. 419, 1972-36 Cum. Bull. 
5. 
77 TREAS. REG. 1.170 A-7(b)(1)(ii) (1974). 
78 Refer to text of Massachusetts Conservation Restriction Law, 
text at n. 34, supra. 
79 Conservation Law Foundation text of seminar notes. The Foun-
dation is a private non-profit organization presently located at 506 
Statler Office Building, Park Square, Boston, MA 02116. 
80 REV. RUL. 205, 1964-30 Cum. Bull. 6. 
81 Id. at 7; TREAS. REG. 1.170-l(c)(1) (1974). 
82 In most cases the "basis" of property is its cost. INT. REV. CODE 
OF 1954, § 1012. 
83 REV. RUL. 205, 1964-30 Cum. Bull. 6, 7. 
84 See n. 79 supra. 
85 Dartmouth #1. Gloucester #1 allows access between June 15 
and September 15 to no more than 20 persons at one time, all of 
whom must hold cards given by the grantee. Wellesley #1 allows 
access to members of the Conservation Council for purposes of na-
ture study only. 
86 Yarmouth #2, Lexington #2. Some restrictions allow public ac-
cess as long as the grantee enforces reasonable regulations to pre-
vent injury to persons or damage to property. See Eastham #3, West 
Tisbury #2. 
87 One restriction is on land with exclusive homes, locked gates, 
and private roads. There is no public benefit other than open space 
land, not even a view. See Chilmark #1. 
88 One grantor refused public access because he did not want to 
be burdened with cleaning up the area. See Topsfield #1. 
89 One restriction, given before the Conservation Restriction Law, 
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was an easement appurtenant. However, no federal tax problems 
were encountered. This may be an indication of a propensity toward 
just such a broad interpretation. See notes on Topsfield #2, 3, 4 in 
Conservation Law Foundation file. 
110 See section on Enforceability, text at nn. 45-56 supra. Some 
jurisdictions even restrict easements to special categories. See 
Brenneman, supra n. 24, at 418. 
81 See supra n. 78. 
82 TREAS. REG. § 1.170A-7(b)(l)(ii) (1974). 
13 [d. § 1.170A-7(a)(3). 
84 An example found in the Regulations is (1) land conveyed to 
the city "as long as it is used for a park" where the city at the time 
of the gift does not plan to use it for anything else (i. e., the chance 
of a different use is remote). [d. § 1.170A-l(e). 
95 See text at n. 156 infra. 
88 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 33 (Supp. 1974). Refer also 
to discussion of the Massachusetts Marketable Title Act, text at nn. 
8-23 supra. 
17 Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (1970). 
88 Harold DeJong, 36 T.C. 896, 899 (1961), aff'd 309 F.2d 373 (9th 
Cir. 1962) . 
• 1 It is interesting to note that the town of Barnstable gives its 
Board of Assessors authority to disallow any reduction in assessed 
taxes where the restriction has been given solely to evade payment 
of full real estate taxes. 
100 Hillsberg, supra n. 65; Comment, Progress and Problems in 
Wisconsin's Scenic and Conservation Easement Program, 1965 WIS. 
L. REV. 352 [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin Conservation Ease-
ments.] 
101 Hillsberg, supra n. 65, at 2-3. 
102 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221 as cited in Hillsberg, supra n. 
65, at 4. 
103 Wisconsin Conservation Easements, supra n. 100, at 358. 
104 An overwhelming majority of the restrictions granted in Mas-
sachusetts were perpetual. 
105 Ebb B. Nay, 19 T.C. 114 (1952) as cited in Wisconsin Conser-
vation Easements, supra n. 100, at 358. 
108 Wineberg v. Comm'r, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963) as cited in 
Hillsberg, supra n. 65, at 5. 
107 Wisconsin Conservation Easements, supra n. 100, at 359-60. 
108 Hillsberg, supra n. 65, at 5. 
lot [d. at 1-6. 
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110 10 B.T.A. 1024 (1928). 
III See n. 82 supra. 
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112 Wisconsin Conservation Easements, supra n. 100, at 362-63. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Inaja Land Co., Ltd., 9 T.C. 727,735 (1947) as cited in Wiscon-
sin Conservation Easements, supra n. 100, at 363. 
116 See note 100 supra. 
117 Barlowe, Ahl, & Bachman, Use- Value Assessment Legislation 
in the United States, 49 LAND ECON. 206, n. 1 (1973) [hereinafter 
cited as Barlowe]. 
118 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 38 (1973). 
119 South v. Texas Eastern Transmission Corp., 332 S.W.2d 442 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1960); Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Sloan, 227 
N.C. 151,41 S.E.2d 361 (1947). 
120 Boston Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549,137 N.E. 
2d 462 (1956). 
121 Id. 
122 Niles v. Bd. of Assessors, 2 Mass. B.T.A. 1, 2 (1933). 
123 216 Mass. 260, 103 N.E. 635 (1913). 
124 216 Mass. 263, 103 N.E. 636 (1913). 
125 Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Sloan, 227 N.C. 151,41 S.E. 
2d 361 (1947). 
126 Tennessee Gas and Transmission Co. v. Jackman, 311 Ky. 507, 
224 S.W.2d 660 (1949). 
127 Lancey v. City of Boston, 186 Mass. 128, 71 N .E. 302 (1904). 
128 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 59, § 11 (1973). 
129 Nyczepir v. State of New York, 76 Misc. 2d 804,350 N.Y.S.2d 
574 (1973); Conservation Law Foundation flyer, "How to Live with 
Conservation Restriction." 
130 Gustafson v. State of New York, 76 Misc. 2d 260,350 N.Y.S.2d 
321 (1973). 
131 Conservation Law Foundation flyer, "How to Live with Con-
servation Restrictions." 
132 Id. 
133 A conservation restriction on land where existing zoning and 
other legal restrictions are already in effect, and where "there is no 
reasonable probability that existing restrictions may be lifted 
within a reasonable time," may cause less diminution in value than 
one upon land where such restrictions do not exist, or if they do 
exist, may be lifted "within a reasonable time." City of Austin v. 
Cannizzo, 153 Tex. 324, 267 S.W.2d 808, 815 (1954). 
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134 Two state bodies, the Department of Natural Resources and 
the Appellate Tax Board, are in positions of authority in this area 
and may set up guidelines for assessors in reassessing restricted 
land. To date, however, no guidance has been forthcoming from 
these bodies. 
135 This is the practice of the Board of Assessors in Topsfield in 
regard to undevelopable land, including farms and golf courses. See 
n. 131 supra. 
138 W. Beeman, THE PROPERTY TAX AND THE SPATIAL PATTERN OF 
GROWTH WITHIN URBAN AREAS, Urban Land Institute Research Mon-
ograph No. 16 (1969). 
137 Rapley v. Montgomery County, 261 Md. 98, 274 A.2d 124 
(1971). The owners did pay, however, a transfer tax of almost 
$231,000.00 upon conveyance of the land. 
138 Whyte, supra n. 2, at 42. 
139 [d. at 43. 
140 [d. 
141 257 Wis. 329, 43 N.W. 2d 458 (1950). 
142 Landowner was a farmer. The court instructed that any benefit 
accruing to the owners due to the now easy accessibility to the 
highway and market must be considered and could be deducted 
from his damages. [d. at 459. 
143 Murphyv. City of Bismarck, 109 N.W.2d 635, 636 (N.D. 1961). 
144 State ex rei. City of St. Paul v. District Court of Ramsey 
County, 75 Minn. 292, 77 N.W. 968 (1899). 
145 Whyte, supra n. 2, at 43 and 43 n. 32. 
148 J. Pickard, CHANGING URBAN LAND USES As AFFECTED By 
TAXATION, at 33, Urban Land Institute Research Monograph No.6 
(1962) . 
147 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 61A, §§ 12, 13 (Supp. 1974). Bar-
lowe, supra n. 117, at 209. 
148 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 61A, §§ 1-24 (Supp. 1974). 
149 "[T]en years from the date of its acquisition or the earliest 
date of its uninterrupted use by the current owner in agriculture or 
horticulture, whichever is earlier ... " [d. § 12. 
150 [d. 
151 [d. § 13. 
152 [d. This section also states that rollback taxes need not be paid 
"if the land involved is purchased for a public purpose by the city 
or town in which it is situated." 
153 "[Rollback taxes] provide a curb or penalty for shifting 
[use], but when the rollback period is short, they represent only a 
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slight deterrent for the speculator who plans to hold his lands at low 
tax cost while he waits for his expected market to emerge." Barlowe, 
supra n. 117, at 211. 
154 [d. at 210. 
155 General Guidelines for Assessors, Town of Barnstable, Conser-
vation Restrictions. 
158 A sample clause would be: "If land is taken by the town then 
this deed is void and the grantor is entitled to full damages." Brews-
ter #1. See also Eastham #1, 4; Duxbury #1; n. 154 supra. An-
other termination clause prescribes that the restriction become void 
if the town ceases to use adjoining land exclusively for conservation 
purposes. Marblehead #1. Of interest is the section of the Agricul-
tural and Horticultural Land Act providing that where property 
assessed at use value under the Act is taken by eminent domain, the 
value of the property will be determined according to normal con-
demnation procedures, with the amount of the conveyance tax, if 
any, added to the condemnation payment as an added value. MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 61A, § 12 (Supp. 1974). 
157 Whyte, supra n. 2, at 21. But see Ellickson, Alternatives to 
Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 694-99 (1973), suggesting that 
zoning can result in great administrative and preventive costs. 
158 Hillsberg, supra n. 65, at 1. 
159 Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of 
Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N. J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). 
180 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
181 "[Zoning] has been used too extensively, particularly in situ-
ations where compensation was clearly owed to the regulated lan-
downer." Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open 
Space, 9 VILL. L. REv. 559, 591 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Eve-
leth] . 
182 Whyte, supra n. 2, at 15-20. 
183 [d. at 21. 
184 [d. at 22. 
165 Slavin, Toward a State Land-Use Policy, 4 LAND USE CON-
TROLS ANNUAL, No.4, at 44 (1970). 
168 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Fair-
fax County]. 
187 Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 
Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390, 396 (1959). 
188 Comment, Techniques for Preserving Open Space, 75 HARv. L. 
REV. 1622, 1627 (1962). 
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188 Due to an increase in distance of available areas from the city 
and/or the betterment theory. See text at nn. 140-44 supra. 
170 344 Mass. 428, 183 N.E. 2d 118 (1962). 
171 Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 
Board of Appeals of Concord v. Housing Appeals Comm., 294 
N.E.2d 393,417 (1973). See also MacGibbon v. Board of Appeals of 
Duxbury, 356 Mass. 642, 255 N.E.2d 348 (1970), recommending use 
of conservation restrictions where the preservation of private land 
was involved and zoning was imipplicable. 
172 Eveleth, supra n. 161, at 591. 
173 Rose, A Proposal for the Separation and Marketability of De-
velopment Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL 
ESTATE L. J. 635 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Rose]. 
174 Id. at 651. 
175 Id. at 652. 
178 Comment, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 
YALE L. J. 338 (1972). 
177 Costonis, supra n. 48. 
178 Rose, supra n. 173, at 648. 
178 Under Floor Area Ratio zoning a building is allowed a certain 
amount of floor area depending upon the size of the lot on which it 
stands. 
180 A program developed by the Rural Land Foundation of Lin-
coln, Massachusetts responded to the criticism "that it provided 
homes only for the well-to-do" by acquiring an additional 69-acre 
tract, planning to set 46 of these acres aside as open space and to 
construct 123 moderate income housing units and a modem com-
mercial area on the remaining 23. See Bergen, The Rural Land 
Foundation of Lincoln, Mass., CASE STUDIES IN LAND CONSERVATION 
(Case #1), The New England Natural Resources Center, 225 Frank-
lin Street, Boston, MA. 02210. 
